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1958] RECENT DECISIONS 809 
CONTRIBUTION-JOINT LIABILITY-CLAIMANT NOT A VOLUNTEER BUT NOT 
SUBJECT TO A COMMON LIABILITY-A passenger was injured while riding in 
an automobile driven by D when it collided with a car driven by C. In the 
passenger's action for damages against C, C cross-complained against D. On 
the day of trial C settled with the passenger with the knowledge and ap-
proval of D. In the ensuing suit for contribution both C and D denied 
negligence; the jury found ·that D was negligent and that C was in no way 
at fault. Since there was no common liability shown, C's claim for con-
tribution was dismissed. C moved to have the court find him negligent as 
a matter of law, but the motion was denied. On appeal, held, reversed. 
While contribution is a right generally limited to persons under a mutual 
obligation, it is appropriately applied to one not under a common liabili-
ty but who had not acted officiously in discharging another's obligation.1 
Rusch v. Korth, (Wis. 1957) 86 N.W. (2d) 464. 
In the classical conception, contribution is regarded as an inchoate 
equity, arising out of the relationship of joint obligors, which ripens into 
a cause of action when one party expends more than his ratable share of 
a common burden.2 Most frequently contribution is sought between sure-
ties on a common obligation, but it has found expression in a myriad of 
analogous situations.3 In cases of joint-tort liability, absent statutory sane-
1 Two justices concurred on the ground that C was entitled to his motion to be 
found negligent as a matter of law. 
2 Wayland v. Tucker, 4 Gratt. (45 Va.) 267 (1848); Western Casualty &: S. Co. v. 
Milwaukee G. C. Co., 218 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933). 
3 E.g., In re Real Estate of Cochran, 81 Del. Ch. 545, 66 A. (2d) 497 (1949), for taxes on 
commonly owned property; Awtry v. Hilman, 193 Misc. 698, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 146 (1948), for 
partnership obligations; Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 206 N.W. 586 (1925), 
for statutory debt of corporate shareholders. 
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tion,4 American courts,5 on the principle which refuses relief to a wrong-
doer, deny contribution between tort-feasors regardless of the character 
of their acts.6 This generalization has been the subject of innumerable 
exceptions7 and it is thought that as jurisprudence becomes emancipated 
from the notion that liability in tort is largely penal in character, the prin-
ciple of contribution may be extended rather than restricted.8 In a few 
jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, contribution among unintentional tort-
feasors has been allowed without the aid of statute.9 
In the principal case the claimant, having fully paid the claim, com-
promised in recognition of a possible adverse judgment, was granted con-
tribution although ultimately found not to have been under a common 
liability. Deviation from traditional limitations was justified on the reason-
ing that if a joint wrongdoer is entitled to contribution, surely one who is 
absolved of liability should be entitled to like relief from one who ought 
in fairness to pay the whole claim.10 To determine whether common liabili-
ty is fundamental to contribution, it is necessary to inquire into the two 
theories underlying the doctrine. The popular analysis is founded upon 
the early English maxims "equality is equity" and "equity delighteth in 
equality."11 Jurisprudence based upon such succinct axioms inevitably 
furnishes an imperfect guide for decision. Yet, since joint liability is an in-
herent element in the necessary "equality," under this analysis contribu-
4 See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 233 (1957). For a 
collection of state statutes abrogating in whole or in part the common law rule against 
contribution, see 1 HAlU'ER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 719 (1956). In City of Charlotte 
v. Cole, 223 N.C. 106, 25 S.E. (2d) 407 (1943), noted in 22 N.C. L. R.Ev. 167 (1944), the 
city, after paying damages to an injured pedestrian, brought suit for contribution under 
the state's Joint Tort-feasors Liability statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-240. Held, since 
the stake that caused the injury was not on its property the city was free from fault. 
The city's mistaken belief that it was liable is insufficient to invoke the statute which 
requires a common liability. 
5 In England the rule was abolished .by the Law Reform Act, 25-26 Geo. 5, c. 30, 
§6(l)(c) (1935). 
6 E.g., Adams v. 'White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 P. 389 (1921); Detroit Ry. Co. 
v. Boomer, 194 ,Mich. 52, 160 N.W. 542 (1916). Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 
186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799), is generally credited with originating the rule, but 
since it involved intentional tort-feasors it does not support the broad proposition for 
which it is so frequently cited in American cases. 
7 45 HARv. L. R.Ev. 349 (1931). 
81 HAlll'ER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 717 (1956). 
9 Undenvriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Davis v. 
Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W. (2d) 355 (1950); Ellis v. Chicago and 
N. W. R. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). 
10 Principal case at 468. 
11 Deering v. The Earl of Winchelsea, 2 Bos. & Pul. 270, 126 Eng. Rep. 1276 (1787); 
Stirling v. Forrester, 3 Bligh. 575, 4 Eng. Rep. 712 (1821). See "The Law of Contribu-
tion," 8 AM. L. R.Eo. (n.s.) 449 to 450 (1869): "Contribution ... in the Roman Law ..• 
existed in but a crude and imperfect form .... T:he English courts of equity in adopting 
this remedy ••• modified and enlarged it, basing it, not upon the narrow ground of 
subrogation, but upon the broadest principles of .natural equity. . • ." 
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tion in the principal case should have been denied. A more satisfactory 
approach is to analyze contribution as a tangent of the law of restitution. 
The term "unjust-enrichment" seldom appears in the cases, yet it is obvi-
ous that the shape which the law of contribution has taken can be explained 
in terms of restitution.12 Clearly, where a non-volunteer discharges the 
liability of another, the latter is unjustly enriched and should make res-
titution. Under this analysis, the element of common liability is of dimin-
ished importance, merely providing conclusive proof that the claimant has 
not acted officiously.13 Accordingly, where a party absolved of liability 
seeks contribution, but proves by other evidence that he was not a volun-
teer, there is no reason to deny recovery. While identical results will gen-
erally be reached under either theory of contribution, the difference in 
theory is saliently illustrated in cases where the party from whom contribu-
tion is sought has a defense good against the party paid by the claimant. 
In these cases there is no unanimity of decision.14 Under the unjust-enrich-
ment analysis, contribution must be denied upon the ground that benefit 
has not been conferred upon the party from whom contribution is sought. 
The fact that this person has a defense would seem irrelevant where ideas 
of basic fairness require that wrongdoers share the financial burden of their 
wrong. As an original consideration, the principal case accomplishes, at 
best, only partial relief under facts where the claimant ought to be fully re-
imbursed. Through either restitution15 or subrogation,16 both equitable 
remedies broad enough to include almost every instance where a non-volun-
teer pays a debt for which another is liable, there could be a complete 
adjustment between the parties with the ultimate burden falling upon 
the party who is at fault.17 While on the facts of the principal case it 
12 " ••• as all are equally bound and are equally relieved, it seems but just that in 
such a case all should contribute in proportion towards a benefit obtained by all, upon 
the maxim, 'Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus'" (He who receives the ad-
vantage ought also to suffer the burden). 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 505 (1886); 
REsrrrUTION RESTATEMENT §81 (1937). 
13 For a discussion of who is a volunteer, see Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L. Q. 
25 (1929); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ed., 5195 (1919). 
14 See Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930), where contribution 
was denied on the ground that defendant was the injured party's father and a child 
could not sue his parent. Accord, Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A. (2d) 595 (1954), 
involving a husband and his spouse. But see Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A. 
(2d) 912 (1945), where defendant was the injured person's husband and contribution 
was allowed although the wife could not sue her husband directly. In Godfrey v. Tide-
water Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E. (2d) 736 (1943), contribution was allowed although 
the statute of limitations barred an action against this wrongdoer. 
15 REsrrrUTioN RESTATEMENT §71(2) (1937): "A person who has paid the debt of 
another in response to the threat of civil proceedings by a third person ... is entitled 
to restitution from the other if the payor acted to avoid trouble and expense." 
16 New York Casualty Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (10th Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 65; 
Yonack v. Interstate Securities Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 649. See also McCuNToCK, 
EQUITY, 2d ed., 210 (1948); 22 N.C. L. REv. 167 (1944). 
17 See Avey v. American Surety Co. of New York, 146 Misc. 224, 260 N.Y.S. 828 
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would have been paradoxical to deny the claimant partial reimbursement 
on the grounds that he :was rightfully entitled to full compensation, the 
decision should be strictly limited to its anomalous factual background. 
The court's cavalier treatment of existing remedial limitations should be 
discouraged where more complete and appropriate remedies are available. 
Melvyn I. Mozinski 
(1930), where a tax collector misappropriated funds, but the town accused plaintiff of 
the theft. After indictment, and also threat of civil suit, plaintiff satisfied the deficiency. 
Held, plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the town on a bond, .to 
which defendant was surety, given the town for the faithful discharge of the collector's 
duties. 
